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EXPLORING  INTERLINKS  BETWEEN 
GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 
A Panel Data Evidence 
MUHAMMAD NADEEM,  MUHAMMAD AZMAT HAYAT  and  RABIA NAZIR* 
Abstract.  Globalization has always remained a fiery issue among 
academia and researchers due to lack of consensus on this subject. A 
potential unresolved issue about globalization is its impact on governance 
and quality of domestic institutions. The present study is an attempt to 
explore the relationship between globalization and governance in a panel 
of 91 countries covering time period from 1984 to 2011. Panel fixed effect 
model and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) have been applied 
for the analysis. Results divulge that globalization has negative and 
statistically significant effect on governance. Thus, the present study 
recommends that globalization, if direly needed, must be espoused with a 
great caution. An effective and efficient liberalization policy is integral to 
reap benefits of globalization. 
Keywords: Globalization, Governance, Panel fixed effect, GMM 
JEL classification:  C33, F60, G30, O50 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The term „Globalization‟ has become popular in the everyday life since 
1990s. Importance of state boundaries is reducing due to the process of 
globalization. But the global economy also needs institutions to deal with 
global polity. Globalization has emerged in a contrasting situation of a 
rapidly occurring change and consistent problems. Cross country transfer of 
information, ideas, technologies, goods, services, capital, finance and people 
have created interdependence among economies. This interdependence has 
created challenges for governments to control and regulate their economies. 
Economic integration, an indicator of globalization, has created the need for 
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harmonization of national policies due to the emergence of interlinked 
markets and economies (Esty and Ivanova, 2003). 
 There are three major benefits of globalization: firstly, globalization 
enhances free market competition and forms an integrated market system 
which is beneficial for all, secondly, in recent era globalization is inevitable 
and, lastly, globalization can benefit the entire world including Third World 
economies by creating free democracies and free trade and business oppor-
tunities (Tjiptoherijanto, 2006). Globalization cogitates world as a unit with 
no socio-political and economic restraints. The objective of globalization is 
to create such an economic order which ensures efficient resource allocation 
and faster economic growth by enhancing competitiveness and efficiency. 
But the effects of globalization are different in developing and developed 
economies with major benefit going to the rich economies (Oduwaye, 2006). 
As Tjiptoherijanto (2006) claimed that impacts of globalization on industrial 
and developing countries especially in Asia and Africa are of different 
nature. Effects of globalization have been distributed unequally where poor 
economies are put into a disadvantageous place due to movement of low 
skilled labour and the creation of intellectual property rights (Griffin, 2003). 
 Globalization may not always result in beneficial impacts for everybody. 
Evidence can be found that globalization may generate either positive or 
negative aftermaths for different economies in the world. For example, 
increased competition creates efficiency and economies of scale leading to 
higher quantity and good quality products and boost living standards 
consequently. But sometimes free movement of factors of production can 
harm labour in some economies due to substitution of labour (Ibrahim, 
2005). Academicians have two divergent views about the impacts of 
globalization; one point of view is that globalization is a beneficial tool for 
the whole world but second point of view blames globalization for the ever 
mounting gap between rich and poor nations and for all the unresolved issues 
of the world. 
 Regarding globalization a major unresolved issue is how to integrate 
globalization with governance. Globalization-Governance nexus is still a 
debate on which consensus is yet to be reached (Bonaglia et al., 2001). 
Governance is relatively a new paradigm which has become popular in the 
last two decades involving three actors namely; government, civil society 
and business society. All the factors have their respective duties and 
functions to create good governance environment (Oduwaye, 2006). As per 
UNDP, governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative 
authority to manage a country‟s affairs at all levels. It comprises of 
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mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and 
mediate their differences. The World Bank defines governance as the way 
power is exercised through a country‟s economic, political and social 
institutions. In present study, this has been measured by composite Inter 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index
1
 as it covers the economic, political and 
social perspectives indicated by World Bank‟s definition of governance. 
 There exists literature on the relationship between economic develop-
ment and globalization, and economic development and better governance, 
but the mechanism through which globalization affects governance and 
domestic institutions is not very much clear. Bonaglia et al. (2001) claimed 
that link of trade openness to domestic institutions is an important aspect of 
governance-globalization nexus. Domestic and international governance is 
facing new challenges in the face of globalization and these challenges are 
particularly more austere for the authoritarian political regimes. The pressure 
on the states to move towards globalization will necessitate the need to 
release authority and state monopoly over the provision of information, 
communication and to empower transnational organizations for making 
business decisions (Saich, 2000). 
 As the socioeconomic and political insinuations of globalization are very 
stanch, the debate on this topic is expected to go on for years. Every time 
when any meeting is held at World Trade Organization, IMF, or World Bank 
platforms, the discussion is divided into the cohorts and antagonists of 
globalization and consensus on the effects of globalization remains an 
unachievable task (Akhter, 2004). In the face of this uncertainty, this study is 
an attempt to lend an empirical support to this ongoing discussion in 
particular reference to its effects on governance and quality of institutions of 
economies, to understand why globalization should affect the quality of 
domestic institutions. Rest of the study follows the sequence as given: 
section II reviews literature on the globalization-governance nexus, section 
III explains the data, methodology, findings and discussion, and section IV 
                                                 
1
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating comprises 22 variables in three 
subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. A separate index is created for 
each of the subcategories. The Political Risk Index is based on 100 points covering both 
political and social attributes, Financial Risk on 50 points, and Economic Risk on 50 
points. The total points from the three indices are divided by two to produce the weights 
for inclusion in the composite country risk score. The composite scores, ranging from zero 
to 100, are then broken into categories from Very Low Risk (80 to 100 points) to Very 
High Risk (zero to 49.9 points). A very low risk can be considered as very good 
governance performance and vice versa. 
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concludes the study by suggesting policy implications based on the findings 
of the study. 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Globalization governance nexus has gained fabulous importance in the recent 
years. Literature on the link between governance and globalization is not 
very much wide. It is tried to review some important studies on this link. 
 Qian and Roland (1996) stated that governments normally bailout those 
enterprises who fail to run themselves successfully. In this case, federal 
governments punish corrupt governments by enhancing competition through 
capital flight which consequently encourages discipline of regional 
governments. Some of the researchers argue that in global world, there is no 
restriction on the flow of capital and information, it is freely available to all, 
and it becomes necessary for governments to improve their governance 
structure (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1998; Summers, 2000). Prakash and Hart 
(1999) noted that globalization reduces institutional impairments, develops 
political institutions and enhances the capacity of judiciary to sustain laws. 
 Rodrik (1999) constructed a model stating that the risk due to global 
markets can be insured with a large government sector. A large public sector 
covers a large magnitude of public and reduces their vulnerability to the 
external global shocks and this was verified empirically. Quality of 
bureaucracy was used as proxy for good governance and proved that rich and 
more liberalized economies also had good administrations. Moreover, it was 
proved that open economies were perceived to have lower corruption 
standards. On the basis of empirical results, it was claimed that the 
successful economies are in a better position to opt for optimal mix of 
governance and globalization. The study has the limitation that it only 
provides graphs displaying broad connections between these variables but 
the evidence on causality of variables is missing. Krugman (1999), Rodrik 
and Subramanian (2009) and Stiglitz (2010) claimed that globalization and 
especially globalization of capital may cause indiscipline and mis-
governance due to providing wrong motivations to governments. Some 
studies also have been found on the link of trade openness and governance. 
Empirical literature on the linkage between trade openness and quality of 
institutions is much limited. Wei (2000) stated that more open economies 
devote more resources to build a good institution; that‟s why their corruption 
level tends to be lower than less open economies. 
 Saich (2000) claimed that in 1980 when China started off on the way to 
globalization the process created political differentiation within China in 
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terms of some sectors, industries and groups got privileges. The author 
discussed four major challenges to domestic governance that were identified 
by this study. First is the expansion of legal system for the accommodation 
of international trade and capital. Second, the reforms have also created new 
inequalities within the economies and this in the third place has created the 
issues about provision of public goods and services, and lastly the challenge 
to remain unbiased from traditional power base in accommodating the forces 
availing benefits from globalization. China made tremendous changes in its 
trade policies and institutional structures to tackle the challenges of 
globalization (foreign trade and investment) but inadequate implementation 
and lack of transparency reduced the efficiency of the system. As the country 
went on the path of free trade borders of special economic zones established 
for this particular purpose were broken down. A conflict among center and 
local governments also aroused due to unpredictable governance on unclear 
lines of power and prerogatives. Due to entry in WTO pressure on legal 
systems was supposed to increase even more for the resolution of economic 
issues and for ensuring transparency in transactions. Moreover, consensus 
between national and international policies was hardly expected to emerge. 
 Bonaglia et al. (2001) stated that productivity, technology and 
development have two way causal relationships. Globalization and 
governance both affect the level of development. Trade through international 
technology transfer, capital flows and migration can lend support to resource 
endowments and to the productivity of the countries. Moreover, good 
governance, quality institutions and developed civil society norms also 
improve the quality of the productive endowments. Here reverse causality 
also exists between good institutions and level of development of an 
economy. Recently interaction of governance and globalization impacting 
growth has emerged as a new debate on this particular issue. The authors 
using a large cross-country sample covering various statistics for the 1995-98 
period measured government spending by dividing them according to their 
level of trade. They found more open countries to be having larger 
government sectors. They were of the view that if the countries are engaged 
highly in trade then they need a bigger public sector to ensure their markets 
from risks. 
 Islam and Montenegro (2002) used a sample of 104 countries to identify 
the determinants of institutional quality. The results they obtained showed 
that institutional quality was robustly depending on trade openness whereas 
inequality and ethnic diversity were not affecting the quality of institutions in 
the selected sample of countries. Hu and Chan (2002) claimed that 
globalization affects governance both at local and international level and 
6 
 
influence the role of state and non-state institutions, but the focus on 
governance in reference to globalization is limited to the capitalist markets 
yet. They conducted a study on Pearl River Delta region of China by first 
reviewing literature on governance in context of development of the region 
and concluded that in the face of globalization, the region is in immense need 
of shift from government to governance. 
 Gilbert (2004) conducted a study using a panel data of 102 economies to 
explore the impact of globalization on economic growth and quality of 
institutions in two separate frameworks. Trade and openness policies both 
had strong impact on economic growth of the selected economies. In his 
second framework after controlling for the effect of institutional quality, he 
proved that in Sub Sahara Africa the impact of trade policies on economic 
growth was dependent on good governance. The authors suggested that in 
Sub Sahara Africa, economic development could not be achieved through 
globalization only because of the low institutional quality of these 
economies. Due to poor institutions the trade policies of these countries 
remain inefficient. 
 Akhter (2004) examined the effect of economic globalization on human 
development and argued that this relationship is supported and reconciled by 
level of corruption and economic freedom. They found economic 
globalization to be affecting economic freedom positively and corruption 
negatively; consequently corruption and economic freedom affect human 
development in negative and positive direction respectively. They further 
explored that with an increase in globalization firms and businesses felt that 
governments over controled their action with the use of different controls 
like tariffs, non-tariff barriers and exchange controls. Thus, the business 
community put pressures on government to open up the economy. However 
there also exist some groups in every economy who feel threatened due to 
opening of the economy which also pressurizes government to keep policy 
restraints intact. Thus, the government is trapped in a dilemma between 
liberalization and restriction. But normally governments liberalize their 
economies while keeping some sectors protected from the impacts of 
globalization. Thus, globalization leads to higher economic freedom. 
Moreover globalization also creates conducive environment for corruption 
by providing healthy environment suitable for corruption to public officials 
and businesses. Normally corruption occurs in economies with a weak 
checks and balance system of governance structure. Opening up of trade and 
greater liberalization assert governments to be more accountable and 
transparent (Akhter, 2004). 
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 A study by IMF in 2005 also found that institutional transitions and 
quality of institutions were affected by trade openness. Relationship between 
trade openness and quality of economic institutions was robust in cross 
country regression but not in panel data sets. Ibrahim (2005) claims that 
widespread disparities among developed and developing countries make the 
globalization process to slow down via the tool of globalization and 
consequently reduce the development pace of underdeveloped economies. 
Trade liberalization fastens the industrialization process of developed 
economies and retards the growth of industry in developing economies. 
Globalization leads to formulation of such policies which benefit rich 
economies at the cost of poor countries and divide the labour in such a way 
that increases disparity among developed and developing countries 
industrialization process. Failure of underdeveloped countries to reap benefit 
from globalization lies in their incapacity to utilize resources fully. 
 Oduwaye (2006) claims that due to weak position of cities in terms of 
economy, infrastructure and institutions, globalization fails to benefit them. 
The practical effects of globalization phenomena embrace a wide range of 
issues at socioeconomic, geographical and political levels. As globalization 
is aimed at creating a new world order by integrating the world economies 
into one economy and want to convert them to a high value economy, 
therefore it needs a strong political structure, good governance and stable 
policies. Dreher et al. (2006) developed an index of economic, social and 
political integration and checked its impact on economic development of 123 
countries from 1970-2000. The index of economic integration was found to 
be robustly related with economic development of the selected economies 
whereas political integration had no effect on development. 
 Levchenko (2007) proposed a model of international trade where 
difference in quality of institutions was modeled in the framework of 
incomplete contracts. They showed that difference in quality of institutions 
made developing economies less advantageous as compared to developed 
economies with good institutions. In these economies factor prices will 
diverge due to trade. At second place the authors tested empirically that 
whether quality of institutions affected trade flows or not and found 
institutions as a robust determinant of trade flows. Mishkin (2007) state that 
a better market discipline and good governance are suggested as major 
benefits of globalization. 
 Busse and Gröning (2008) using a large country sample studied the 
impact of trade openness on governance of the respective countries. They 
found that trade had impact on governance but its magnitude was smaller 
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than the other political variables. The countries having very less score on 
governance scale experienced very minor impact of trade on their 
governance quality. Another important fact they explored was that countries 
exporting high resource intensive products like fuel and minerals failed to 
reap benefit from trade. The reason behind this is that governance quality 
will be deteriorated due to enhanced extraction and increased exports of 
resources. Inflation and economic growth had small impact on governance 
but educational attainment had a strong significant impact on governance in 
other tested determinants of governance by the study. They further explored 
that there were three channels through which trade liberalization affected 
governance structure of the economies. At first place the country learn from 
each other experiences and will adapt the successful institutions and regula-
tory framework. Secondly increased competition with world economies will 
require improvement in the domestic institutional structures because without 
this their business will go out of businesses. 
 Martinelli and Midttun (2010) analyzed the governance literature in a 
conceptual framework and filtered out a governance strategy consisting of 
three elements: First, a re-interpretation of Montesquieu‟s principle of checks 
and balances, which is applied to the interrelations between state, markets 
and civil society along with state institutions is required. Second, a flexible 
framework allowing joint effort to develop good governance should be 
developed. Third, open communications must be allowed for the constitution 
of important governance elements and lastly for global governance parallel 
governance models must be used by supporting one another. 
 Ju and Wei (2011) emphasized on two ways relationship between capital 
globalization and quality of domestic institutions. Trade according to many 
economists can affect the performance of the economies but this can be 
achieved with the help of complementary factors like physical and human 
capital, public infrastructure and governance. 
 Blouin et al. (2012) propose a framework for this by assuming that 
government‟s decision making power is normally dependent on a soft budget 
constraint. They stated that public policy normally support such projects 
which require little effort and are subject to budget overruns and 
consequently minimal productivity. Capital movement becomes cheaper due 
to the globalization of capital. In such cases globalization of capital can 
enhance the capital flight even more. This threat of capital flight may lead to 
decrease the actions taken by government. This standard view of the 
disciplining role of globalization states that in such a situation government is 
restrained to a limited range of actions for decision making. The impact of 
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globalization on welfare works through the channel of incentive effect of 
good governance. But the authors state that the disciplining effects of capital 
globalization would only work when the economy is not vulnerable to 
random external shocks and is characterized by powerful economic 
fundamentals. But if the capital flight is frequently affected by random 
shocks in the global economy, then threat of capital flight will lead to over 
disciplines and mis-governance of the economy. Thus, globalization may 
lead governance on either way. In global world a shock in one economy 
affects investment in other economies directly and uncertainty in one country 
also lends uncertainty to others as well. Subject to global uncertainty globali-
zation affects quality of bureaucratic governance negatively. Moreover this 
negative impact of globalization on governance is more adverse in countries 
with low state capacity of bureaucracy. The authors quoted the example of 
Mexican crisis of 1994 which is a clear example of uncertainty in 
international financial markets. They claimed that if an economy is 
characterized with weak institutions like Mexican‟s economy then the 
uncertain effects of globalization on governance will be more adverse. 
III.  MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
In the present study, panel data has been used from 1984-2011; data has been 
collected from World Development Indicators (WDI), The Quality of 
Government Basic Dataset by University of Gothenburg and Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI) by Philip Keefer (2012). The general form of the 
empirical specification of the model used in present study can be written as: 
 Yit  =  Kit β + Wi α + εit 
i = cross section dimension 
t = time series dimension 
Yit = Governance in i
th
 cross section in t
th
 time period, explained 
variable represented by composite Inter Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) index. 
Kit β = Matrix of independent variables (does not have intercept term) 
including globalization measured by KOF index of 
globalization. 
Wit α = The heterogeneity or individual effects, keep in mind Wi has an 
intercept term and a set of country specific variables, that can 
be observed for example as religion, location, weather 
conditions, ethnicity or they might be unobservable, such as 
country specific characteristics, difference in skills or 
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preferences and so on, if we assume all these country specific 
characteristics are observed and are constant, then this model 
will be like simple Classical Linear Regression Model and we 
can estimate it with simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) but 
this is rare and often we face a complex situation when Wi is 
unobserved and have a correlation with Kit. 
 In such a case OLS estimator will give biased and inconsistent results 
because we were not able to model the unobserved effects, so our model 
suffers from the problem of omitted variables. Under fixed effect or least 
square dummy variables (LSDV) model, we overcome this problem with the 
help of dummy variables and we generate a dummy variable for each cross 
section to control the effect of country specific unobserved effects. This is 
reflected in differences in constant terms; now constant term will be a group-
specific constant term. In the fixed effect model: 
  Yit  =  Kit β + αi + εit 
αi = Wi α has all those effects and it enumerates an estimable conditional 
mean. The Fixed Effect Model considers “αi” to be country specific intercept 
in the regression model, it is worth mentioning that the term “Fixed” is used 
to denote the correlation of Wi and Kit and it does not mean that Wi is non-
stochastic. If we assume that the unobserved country specific effects are not 
correlated with the included variables then this assumption takes us to the 
Random Effect Model which is based on the idea that if dummy variables, in 
fact represents the lack of knowledge about the true model then why not 
represent this ignorance in the disturbance term and this is the reason why 
random effect model is also called error component model, instead of 
treating intercept term to be country specific constant we assume it random 
and it can be formulated as: 
Yit = Kit β + E[Wi α] + {Wi α – E[Wi α]} + εit 
 = Kit β + α + µi + εit 
 The above model is having now composite error term which consists of 
two elements, one country specific error component and the other combined 
time series and cross section component. We may say that the main 
difference between Fixed and Random Effect is that whether the unobserved 
country specific effects are correlated with the independent variables in the 
model, whether these effects are random or not. Hausman test is used to 
determine whether fixed effect or random effect model is more appropriate 
for estimation purposes. Hausman test is based on the idea that under the null 
hypothesis we test, there is no correlation between omitted variables and 
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independent variables and in such situation both OLS, LSDV (fixed effect) 
and FGLS (random effect) estimators are consistent, but OLS is inefficient 
due to the fact that they may not be constant both over time and space, 
whereas under the alternative, LSDV is consistent, but FGLS is not as there 
may be correlation between omitted variables and independent variables. 
Therefore, under the null hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ 
systematically. 
 Hausman test has been applied to test whether it is appropriate to use 
Fixed Effect Model or Random Effects Model for estimation. The results of 
Hausman test, in all specifications, show that the value of probability is 
0.000 which is less than 5% level of significance (0.05) so we reject the null 
and conclude that the Fixed Effect Model estimation is more appropriate in 
all four (1, 2, 3, 4) specifications. Therefore, econometric models have been 
estimated by using Fixed Effect Model. There is most likely to be the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in panel data so this problem has been 
rectified by using the robust standard errors. Table 1 shows the results of 
fixed effect models with robust standard errors. 
 The results of all specifications show that globalization has negative and 
statistically significant effect on governance. It may be due to the fact that 
globalization may create challenges for domestic institutions to tackle 
international governance and leads to mis-governance by the governments. 
The result is consistent with the framework proposed by Blouin et al. (2012). 
In global world a shock in one economy affects investment in other 
economies directly and uncertainty in one country also lends uncertainty to 
others as well. Subject to global uncertainty globalization affects Quality of 
Bureaucratic Governance negatively. Saich (2000) presented a case of China, 
claimed that China had to face different challenges to its governance 
structure due to globalization like a need to enlarge its legal systems, creation 
of new inequalities within the economy (conflict among local and central 
governments also aroused), problem in provision of public goods and 
services and a challenge for authority to remain unbiased, and owing to 
inefficiency of government to tackle challenges proposed by globalization, 
domestic governance is affected badly. Rodrik (1999) stated that the risk due 
to global markets can be insured with a large government sector. But larger 
public   sector   can   also   increase   the  exploitation  power  of  government 
TABLE  1 
Results of Fixed effect Models with Robust Standard Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Globalization –0.00758*** 
[0.000] 
–0.0066*** 
[0.000] 
–0.00671*** 
[0.000] 
–0.00764*** 
[0.000] 
Freedom of press –0.0019** 
[0.053] 
–0.0017** 
[0.061] 
–0.00195** 
[0.036] 
–0.00160*** 
[0.000] 
Labour force 
Participation rate 
0.0020 
[0.654] 
0.000162 
[0.958] 
–0.0000732 
[0.981] 
 
Per capita income –4.32 
[0.172] 
–3.75** 
[0.074] 
–3.71** 
[0.081] 
 
Presidential system –0.0487** 
[0.042] 
   
Regime type  0.0084 
[0.533] 
  
Size of largest 
party 
  0.0484** 
[0.037] 
 
Property rights    0.00101*** 
[0.000] 
Civil liberties    0.00752 
[0.124] 
Political rights    0.000084 
[0.984] 
FH status    007678 
[0.430] 
Constant 1.027*** 
[0.000] 
1.057*** 
[0.000] 
1.067*** 
[0.000] 
1.0101*** 
[0.000] 
Hausman 
test 
Chi Sq. 
statistic 
209.61*** 414.82*** 517.66*** 442.40*** 
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
***, **, * show significance at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance respectively. In 
[ ] are P-values. 
officials and may create malfunctioning in government institutions. Thus, 
globalization may generate negative effects on governance. Akhter (2004) 
states that globalization puts pressure (pressure comes from two opposite 
directions; firms pressurize to open up due to the fear of over control by 
government and while some groups who feel threatened due to globalization 
favour restriction) on governments and they are trapped in a dilemma of 
decision about opening up of economy. This can deteriorate the quality of 
policy regulation and efficiency of governments and may end up with 
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negative effect on governance. Malpractices in Trade agreements between 
nations can also ruin their governance structure. 
 Freedom of press has negative sign and statistically significant in all 
specifications which is according to expectation. Freedom of press index 
ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free), so if there is an increase in the 
score of index, governance will be badly affected because higher score of 
this index shows least freedom to press. We may say that Free Press plays 
the role of watchdog in the economy. Ahrend (2002) also gave similar 
findings, he proposes that freedom of press by enhancing monitoring 
capacity of society creates better checks and balance on bureaucrats and 
politicians and helps reducing corruption. Thus, higher is the freedom of 
press better will be the governance. 
 Labour Force Participation Rate has been used in three specifications as 
a proxy for human capital. As, if the people are having higher level of 
education and skills then they are most likely to participate in labour force. It 
was assumed to have positive effect on Governance as high qualified and 
skilled labour force is assumed to be familiar with their rights and 
obligations which can be helpful for making Governance better, but it is 
insignificant in all the specifications. Per capita income also has been used in 
first three speciation on the assumption that having higher level of income 
means no worries about subsistence level and not compelled to break rules 
and regulations to make their livelihood but here we find some opposite story 
as this variable is showing negative impact and significant as well in two 
specifications so we find some evidence for “Might is Right”. 
 Presidential system has negative effect on governance which might be 
due to misuse of monarchy power and lack of checks and balances. In second 
specification Presidential system has been replaced by Regime Type 
(democratic = 1 and 0 = otherwise) the sign of Democratic Regime turned 
out positive which means democracy makes governance better, but it is 
statistically insignificant. In third specification Regime Type has been 
replaced by size of the Largest Democratic Party and it has positive sign and 
statistically significant as well, means that if there is Democracy and the size 
of the Largest Party is bigger, then it can make Governance better. This may 
be due to the reason that if the Size of The Largest Party is bigger enough to 
make the Government alone then it can perform in a better way, which may 
be due to the reason that in coalition Governments, coalition parties may 
hinder the performance of the leading party by rent seeking behaviour, unjust 
demands of power sharing of the coalition parties may detoriate the 
performance. Whereas if a single party is large enough to make government 
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then it will have better Legislative power and can perform better. In the last 
specification, we incorporate Civil Liberties, Property Rights, Political 
Rights and Freedom Status (for description of these variables see Appendix) 
to have further insights but we find support only in case of Property Rights, 
better Property Rights are helpful for making governance better, while Civil 
Liberties, Political Rights and Freedom Status are having no significant 
impact on Governance. 
 We have also considered an extension to a dynamic model which can be 
written as: 
 Yit  =  Kit β + δYi,t–1 + Ci + εit 
Because there can be a problem of “Endogenity” in the model as one of the 
regressors (per capita income) is also component of ICRG index, for this 
purpose the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators will be 
used in the analysis. In this context the estimators introduced by Holtz-
Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) are increasingly popular. The 
Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator is different GMM that treats the 
model as a system of equations, one for each time period; the equations 
differ only in their instrument/moment condition sets. The predetermined 
(correlated with past errors, but not with current and future errors) and 
endogenous (correlated with past and present errors, but not with future 
errors) variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of 
their own levels. Strictly exogenous regressors (not correlated with errors in 
all temporal periods) as well as any other instruments can enter the 
instrument matrix in the conventional instrumental variables fashion; in first 
differences, with one column per instrument. 
 Whereas system GMM is the augmented version of GMM delineated in 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and fully developed in Blundell and Bond (1998) 
who enunciated the necessary assumptions for this augmented estimator. 
Lagged levels are often poor instruments for first differences, especially for 
variables that are close to a random walk. Thus, the original equations in 
levels can be added to the system, and the additional moment conditions 
could increase efficiency. In these equations, predetermined and endogenous 
variables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own first 
differences. In the present study, system GMM developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) has been used for estimation purposes because of its superiority 
over difference GMM. Estimates are one step and one lag has been used as 
instruments, as David Roodman (2009) suggested that for a variable, w, that 
is not strictly exogenous, “lag 1 is valid”. 
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TABLE  2 
Dynamic Panel Data Estimation (System GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LICRG 0.91177*** 
[0.000] 
.900619*** 
[0.000] 
0.91237*** 
[0.000] 
0.8766*** 
[0.000] 
Globalization –0.004703*** 
[0.000] 
–0.003907*** 
[0.000] 
–0.003657*** 
[0.000] 
–0.00209*** 
[0.000] 
Freedom of press –0.001262*** 
[0.000] 
–0.000475** 
[0.046] 
–0.0007207*** 
[0.003] 
–0.00069** 
[0.036] 
Labour force 
participation rate 
–0.0031417*** 
[0.004] 
–0.0008407 
[0.332] 
–0.0015998* 
[0.052] 
 
Per capita income 5.6906*** 
[0.000] 
5.0806*** 
[0.000] 
4.3106*** 
[0.000] 
 
Presidential 
system 
–0.0227673* 
[0.103] 
   
Regime type  0.017144** 
[0.014] 
  
Size of largest 
party 
  0.004389 
[0.724] 
 
Property rights    0.00109*** 
[0.000] 
Civil liberties    –0.0106** 
[0.013] 
Political rights    –0.0046 
[0.190] 
FH status    0.000121 
[0.989] 
Constant 0.535013*** 
[0.000] 
0.30636*** 
[0.000] 
0.357775*** 
[0.000] 
0.2117*** 
[0.000] 
***, **, * show significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. in [ ] are P-values. 
 The results of GMM are given in Table 2 which show almost similar 
results as by fixed effect model in Table 1. However, per capita income has 
different impact on governance under GMM estimation, so its impact is 
inconclusive in this study. Lag value of dependent variable is positive and 
significant in all specifications. It means current governance level depends 
upon governance level in the previous year. Institutions take a long time to 
develop, once they are established they will need a lot of time to change. 
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That‟s why lagged value of governance is significantly affecting current 
quality of institutions. Globalization has similar (negative) impact under 
GMM estimation as well, so we may confer that globalization has negative 
impact on economy-wise governance. 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Globalization has always remained a hot issue among academia and 
researchers due to lack of consensus on this subject. A potential unresolved 
issue about globalization is its impact on governance. The present study has 
been an attempt to explore interlinks between globalization and governance 
and to lend empirical support to this discussion. Panel of 91 countries (for 
detail of countries included in the study see Appendix) covering time period 
from 1984 to 2011 has been used for analysis. Fixed effect model has been 
applied with robust standard errors to resolve the issue of heteroskedasticity. 
Results of all specifications show that globalization has negative and 
statistically significant effect on governance. This has been found consistent 
with the framework proposed by Blouin et al. (2012). Dynamic effects also 
have been considered in the model due to the possibility of the presence of 
endogeniety. The results of GMM also reveal that globalization has negative 
impact on governance; so we may confer that globalization has negative 
impact on economy wise governance. We recommend that globalization 
policy must be devised on rational lines. Globalization if direly needed must 
be adopted with a great caution. An effective and efficient liberalization 
policy is integral to reap benefit from globalization without harming 
institutional infrastructure of the country. 
 It is healthier to tersely discuss on the limitations of our study in the end. 
Firstly, the most significant of these limitations is that our study has used 
composite ICRG index as a proxy for governance which may not be perfect 
representative of the governance. Secondly, this study used the panel of 91 
countries taken from different regions of the world, so the results represent 
the whole panel. Whereas the impact of globalization on governance may be 
different in different regions; for example, it may be positive in some regions 
particularly in developed regions and negative in developing regions, this can 
be further explored. 
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APPENDIX 
Region wise list of countries included in the study: 
South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan. 
East Asia and Pacific: Australia, Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore. 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Burkina Faso, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, 
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, Sudan, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
Europe and Central Asia: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, United 
Kingdom. 
Latin America and Caribbean: Argentina, Brazil, Bahamas, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
North America: Canada, United States of America. 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Civil Liberties 
Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational 
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without 
interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary 
over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free). 
Political rights 
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, 
including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate 
elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, 
and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and 
are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies 
over the years. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free). 
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Property Rights 
This factor scores the degree to which a country's laws protect private 
property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. 
It also accounts for the possibility that private property will be expropriated. 
In addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of 
corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses 
to enforce contracts. The less certain the legal protection of property is and 
the greater the chances of government expropriation of property are, the 
higher a country‟s score is. The country‟s property rights score ranges from 0 
and 100, where 100 represent the maximum degree of protection of property 
rights. 
The press freedom 
The press freedom index is computed by adding four (three) component 
ratings: Laws and regulations, Political pressures and controls, Economic 
Influences and Repressive actions (the latter is since 2001 not assessed as a 
separate component). The scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free). 
Size of Largest Party in Legislature (in Fractions) 
Size of Largest Party in Legislature (in Fractions) counts the largest parties. 
Number of seats divided by the legislative assemblies. Total number of seats 
expressed in fractions. In countries with a two-chamber parliament the lower 
house is counted. 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in current US dollars. 
Labour force participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 
and older that is economically active: all people who supply labour for the 
production of goods and services during a specified period. 
Regime Type 
Equals 1 for democratic regime and 0 otherwise (variable modified) 
Presidential Republic 
Equals 1 if the country is a presidential republic and 0 otherwise (variable 
modified) 
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FH Status 
Variable modified as, if free = 1, otherwise = 0 
Governance 
Represented by composite Inter Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index, it ranges 
from 0 to 100 and closer to 100 means very low level of risk which can be an 
indicator of good governance and if the value of the index is closer to zero it 
means very high level of risk which can be an indication of very poor 
governance. 
Globalization 
Measured by KOF index of globalization it ranges from 0 to 100 and closer 
to 100 means high level of globalization and vice versa. 
 
